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W hen a town manager is faced with the need 
both to repair the town's sewers 
and to resurface its roads, it 
would only be logical that he or 
she do the former first. Otherwise 
the roads will essentially have to 
be done twice- and at no small 
expense to the town . It may hap-
pen, however, that for the pres-
ent only the resurfacing project 
has enough popular support to be 
carried out. In that case, the town 
manager must seek the next best 
solution, i.e., the one that will 
minimize the cost of repairing 
the sewers at some future time. 
This can be done, for instance, 
by starting on the roads that will 
be least affected by sewer repairs 
later; by selecting less expensive 
surfacing materials, such as 
those that are designed to last I 0 
years instead of 30; and by 
avoiding new surfaces that will 
make it harder than it already is 
to get to the sewers. 
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What is true for roads and 
sewers is also true for policies to 
address global warming and acid 
rain . That is, policy prescrip-
tions directed at one problem 
can make the other easier or 
more difficult to solve . At the 
third and fourth Conferences of 
the Parties to the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Cli-
mate Change (held in Kyoto in 
December I 997 and Buenos 
Aires in November 1998), the 
world's attention focused on 
greenhouse gases stemming 
from the combustion of fossil 
fuels, particularly carbon diox-
ide.1 But the same fuels also 
produce sulfur dioxide, the prin-
cipal cause of acid rain . At pres-
ent, no one has a firm grip on 
the potential interactive effects 
of carbon dioxide and sulfur 
dioxide or on the policies-both 
implemented and proposed-
attempting to limit each of these 
substances separately . 
To address these issues, re-
searchers at the International 
Institute for · Applied Systems 
Analysis (IIASA), a private re-
search institute located in Laxen-
burg, Austria, recently carried 
out a set of modeling exercises 
focusing on interactive effects. 
Although these exercises were 
conducted for all regions of the 
world, this article focuses on 
Asia, where populations are large 
and growing; living standards 
(and thus energy use) are low for 
most individuals but aspirations 
are high; and most of the fossil 
fuels currently being used are 
dirty . The resulting scenarios 
yield some surprises about the 
interactive effects between the 
two types of emissions and poli-
cies to control them. They also 
offer important insights into how 
policymakers might exercise 
long-term foresight while re-
maining responsive to the current 
political realities. 
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Fossil Fuel Emissions and 
Pollution in Asia 
In terms of total suspended 
particulates, Asia is home to all 
15 of the most polluted cities in 
the world, as well as to 19 of the 
20 most polluted cities. In terms 
of sulfur dioxide, Asia hosts the 
world's four worst cities and 15 
of its worst 19.2 Moreover, 
Asia's situation is likely to get 
even worse because there are no 
international agreements to limit 
air pollution comparable to those 
initiated in Europe and North 
America 20 years ago. Indeed, 
national control efforts are only 
now beginning to spread beyond 
Japan to fast-growing, highly 
polluting countries like China. 
Europe and North America 
adopted the Convention on 
Long-Range Transboundary Air 
Pollution (LRTAP) in 1979. 
This instrument led to four sub-
sequent protocols limiting emis-
sions of various sorts : sulfur 
dioxide ( 1985), nitrogen oxides 
( 1988), volatile organic com-
pounds ( 1991 ), and sulfur diox-
ide even further (1994 ). As a 
result, sulfur dioxide emissions 
in Europe (including European 
areas of the former Soviet Un-
ion) decreased 32 percent from 
1980 to 1990 (from 52 million 
tons to 36 million tons). In 
North America, these protocols 
and the Clean Air Act Amend-
ments enacted by the United 
States in 1990 reduced sulfur 
dioxide emissions 31 percent 
from 1980 to 1995 (from 28 
million tons to 20 million tons) .3 
Historical data for Asia are 
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more problematic, but the trends 
are clearly in the other direction. 
The data indicate a roughly 60 
percent increase in sulfur dioxide 
emissions from 1980 to 1990, 
from about 11 million tons to 18 
million tons.4 And without spe-
cific policies and agreements to 
limit such emissions, all projec-
tions point to even greater in-
creases in the future . The two 
main reasons for this are the re-
gion's rapid economic growth 
and its high dependence on coal. 
Once Asia recovers from the 
financial crisis that hit at the end 
of 1997, its growth is expected to 
again be the fastest in the world. 
Owing to increases in energy 
efficiency, the region's energy 
requirements will not rise as 
rapidly as its economic output, 
but the rise wi II sti II be substan-
tial. For China and India in par-
ticular, this is likely to mean 
using a lot more coal- and thus 
producing a lot more air pollu-
tion. Kilowatt for kilowatt, a 
typical coal-fired power plant in 
China emits about 100 times the 
sulfur dioxide released by a plant 
using natural gas (though the 
exact amount depends on the 
type of coal used). Compared to 
nuclear or hydroelectric power, 
which emit no sulfur dioxide, 
coal is "infinitely dirty." 
Without new control policies, 
sulfur emissions in Asia (exclud-
ing the Middle East and Asian 
areas of the former Soviet Union) 
are estimated to grow another 160 
percent between 1990 and 2020, 
from 18 million tons to 48 million 
tons. Projections like these, com-
bined with the already low air 
quality in many Asian cities, have 
begun to prompt policy actions in 
some countries. In China, for ex-
ample, environmental efforts are 
picking up speed at both the local 
and national levels. Last Decem-
ber, Beijing adopted 19 emer-
gency measures to improve its air 
quality, including a ban on burn-
ing coal in the city center. Beijing 
is also in the midst of a program to 
introduce 15,000 natural gas vehi-
cles and 100 natural gas stations in 
the city. In the city of Guangzhou, 
430,000 motorcycle owners will 
have had to add devices to clean 
their exhaust by 1 March 1999. 
Shenyang has banned high-sulfur 
coal and leaded gasoline. Shang-
hai has new exhaust regulations 
slated for 1 December 1999 and is 
almost midway through a program 
to convert 7,000 taxis to liquid 
petroleum gas (LPG) or natural 
gas within the next four years. 
Chengdu will require all city busi-
nesses to switch to clean sources 
of energy before July 2000. 
Nationally, gasoline producers 
are to stop making leaded gaso-
line by the end of 1999 and sup-
pliers are to stop selling it by July 
2000 . Import tariffs on particu-
late removal equipment have 
been reduced, and last year China 
established sulfur dioxide emis-
sion limits on industry-along 
with emissions fees-in two spe-
cial control zones in south and 
central China. Although these 
zones comprise only 11.4 percent 
of China's total area, they ac-
count for 60 percent of the coun-
try's sulfur emissions. In addition 
to the restrictions on emissions, 
no new coal mines may be 
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Table 1. Population, 1990-2100 (millions) 
Region 1990 2020 2050 2100 
Sub-Saharan Africa 488 1,080 1,690 1,922 
Centrally planned Asia 1 1,242 1,654 1,815 1,778 
Central and Eastern Europe 124 123 116 97 
Former Soviet Union 289 311 330 350 
Latin America and the Caribbean 434 698 920 1,085 
Middle East and North Africa 270 585 985 1,424 
North America 281 358 403 460 
Pacific OECD 144 155 146 122 
Other Pacific Asia 428 625 783 805 
South Asia 1,128 1,858 2,405 2,325 
Western Europe 434 475 461 394 
World 5,262 7,922 10,055 10,761 
'Includes China , Hong Kong , Laos, Viet Nam, Cambodia, North Korea, and Mongolia. 
NOTE: Detail may not sum to totals due to rounding. 
SOURCE: llASA Population Project. 
opened in these zones if the coal 
to be extracted has a sulfur con-
tent of more than 3 percent, and 
production from existing mines is 
restricted . Finally, no new coal-
fired power plants can be built 
near the major cities in these 
zones, and existing plants using 
coal with more than I percent 
sulfur content must install desul-
furization technology. 5 
Tip O'Neill, a former speaker 
of the U.S. House of Representa-
tives, once observed that "all 
politics is local." It is therefore 
no surprise that China is willing 
to limit its sulfur emissions-
whose impacts on its own 
citizens are relatively immediate 
and clear-while (like India) 
staunchly resisting pressure to 
limit its carbon emissions. This is 
much the same road traveled by 
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the Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) countries, who were 
(and still are) much more willing 
to spend money on local and 
regional pollution problems than 
on global problems such as cli-
mate change. 
Given this reality, how does 
one design policies that are re-
sponsive to current political pres-
sures to reduce sulfur emissions 
without impeding subsequent 
efforts to limit carbon emissions? 
To answer this question, one 
must project how alternative 
policies-for both sulfur and 
carbon emissions-would affect 
each other in terms of two sets of 
interactions: those among the 
incentives each creates and those 
among the remaining pollutants 
that each produces. 
Major Assumptions 
The IIASA researchers began 
by establishing a baseline, that is, 
by asking what would happen if 
policymakers in Asia and the rest 
of the world were to introduce no 
control measures beyond those 
already in place for carbon and 
sulfur emissions. Of course, to 
derive a valid baseline, it was 
necessary to make a number of 
other assumptions as well, par-
ticularly with respect to popula-
tion growth, economic growth, 
and technological advances. The 
assumed rates of population 
growth are shown in Table I; 
these are the middle-of-the-road 
projections prepared by IIASA's 
Population Project. The good 
news here is that worldwide 
population growth is expected to 
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Table 2. Economic growth rates, 1950-2100 (percent per year) 
Region 1950-1990 1990-2020 2020-2050 2050-2100 
Sub-Saharan Africa 2.7 4.3 5.2 4.2 
Centrally planned Asia 1 6.1 8.4 3.8 2.2 
Central and Eastern Europe 3.9 1.8 5.0 2.0 
Former Soviet Union 5.2 0.4 5.4 2.8 
Latin America and the Caribbean 4.2 3.7 3.8 2.7 
Middle East and North Africa 4.6 4.8 3.6 3 .6 
North America 3.3 2.3 1.9 1.6 
Pacific OECD 6.2 1.8 1.2 0.9 
Other Pacific Asia 9.8 6 .1 4.3 2.2 
South Asia 4 .5 3.8 5.2 4.2 
Western Europe 3.7 2.0 1.4 1.0 
All Asia2 6.0 4.2 3.5 2.4 
World 4.0 2.9 2.9 2.4 
11ncludes China, Hong Kong , Laos, Viet Nam, Cambodia, North Korea, and Mongolia . 
21ncludes centrally planned Asia, Pacific OECD, other Pacific Asia, and South Asia. 
SOURCE: JJASA Environmentally Compatible Energy Strategies Project. 
slow: Instead of the 40 years re-
quired to achieve the most recent 
doubling of population, the next 
doubling will take about 90 years. 
The bad news is that this will still 
add 5.3 billion people, so that by 
2 100 global population will reach 
I 0.8 billion. 
Table 2 shows the assumptions 
about economic growth. To ac-
count for important regional differ-
ences, separate figures are given 
for the 11 regions into which the 
llASA analysts divided the world, 
along with a subtotal for the four 
regions that comprise Asia. The 
basic pattern is that "the poor get 
richer while the rich slow down." 
According to these projections, 
there will be substantial social and 
economic development, particu-
larly in the South. For the next 
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several decades, Asia will average 
annual economic growth of about 4 
percent, compared with 6 percent 
between 1950 and 1990. The world 
as a whole will experience eco-
nomic growth of about 3 percent, 
compared with 4 percent between 
1950 and 1990. This is a future that 
is assumed to be free of major wars 
and other catastrophes. It is a pros-
perous but realistic future charac-
terized by large productivity 
increases and free and uncon-
strained trade among all regions. 
The next set of crucial as-
sumptions has to do with tech-
nology. The assumption of no 
new policies to limit sulfur and 
carbon emissions does not mean 
that technology stops improving. 
Technology has never been 
static. It has consistently ad-
vanced since the beginning of the 
Industrial Revolution- regardless 
of the particular policies in 
place- and there is no reason to 
expect the process to suddenly 
grind to a halt. As a starting 
point, therefore, the IIASA re-
searchers assumed that historical 
patterns of technological im-
provement will continue, both at 
the level of individual technolo-
gies and at the broader level of 
national economies. The distinc-
tion between these two levels 
deserves further comment be-
cause, as will be seen below, 
patterns of technological im-
provement are crucial to envi-
ronmental impacts and depend 
greatly on the policies adopted 
and the investments made in the 
relatively short term. In other 
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words, technology is a factor that 
we can do something about now 
that will make a big difference to 
the environment in the long term. 
With respect to individual tech-
nologies, the researchers assumed 
that each such technology will 
benefit from learning-curve effects 
that are consistent with previous 
history. Leaming curves reflect the 
fact that as society gains experience 
with new technologies, they be-
come more efficient and their costs 
come down. The improvements are 
usually rapid at first and then 
gradually taper off. Figure 1 shows 
historical examples related to en-
ergy. Such improvements pertain 
not only to renewable sources, like 
windmills and photovoltaics, but 
also to the processes used to ex-
plore for, develop, and produce 
fossil fuels. These have historically 
improved at a rate of about 1 per-
cent per year, and this trend was 
assumed to continue. Given the 
substantial fossil fuel resources that 
are still available, this means that 
oil, gas, and particularly coal will 
probably be major inexpensive 
sources of energy far into the fu-
ture. This is good for the world's 
pocketbook, of course, but it may 
well be bad for the environment. 
At the level of regional econo-
mies, both technological develop-
ment and economic shifts (from 
agriculture to industry and then to 
services) are captured by an indi-
cator referred to as primary energy 
intensity. This measures the amount 
of primary energy (tons of coal, 
barrels of oil, cubic meters of natu-
ral gas, and so forth) needed to 
produce a dollar of gross domestic 
product (GDP). Historically, energy 
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intensity has decreased as econo-
mies developed, and this pattern 
was assumed to continue. Thus, the 
richer a country becomes (in terms 
of GDP per person), the more en-
ergy efficient its economy should 
be. And the faster it grows, the 
more quickly one would expect to 
see its energy intensity decline. 
What these assumptions imply 
for energy use is shown in Figure 2. 
Of particular significance is the 
expansion of coal use worldwide 
and Asia's increased importance as 
an energy consumer. Even though 
global primary energy use rises at 
an average rate of only 1.4 percent 
per year-less than two-thirds the 
historical average since 1860 and 
less than projected economic 
growth-absolute energy con-
sumption is 68 percent higher in 
2020 than in 1990, 1 73 percent 
higher in 2050, and 350 percent 
higher in 2100. Coal use also in-
creases rapidly. By 2020, it sur-
passes oil as the single largest 
source of primary energy, and its 
Figure 1. Technology learning curves, electricity generation 
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Figure 2. Primary energy supply by source, 1990-2100 
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dominance increases steadily right 
through 2100. Although less and 
less coal is used directly (for ex-
ample, to heat homes), coal is king 
in electricity generation and after 
2050 it becomes an important 
source of synthetic liquid and 
gaseous fuels. Coal use doubles 
between 1990 and 2020, more than 
triples by 2050, and rises to eight 
times its 1990 level by 2100. At the 
same time, more and more of the 
world's energy is consumed 
in Asia; that region's share of pri-
mary energy use increases from 
26 percent in 1990 to more than 
41 percent in 2100. Putting the two 
trends together results in a tripling 
of Asia's coal use between 1990 
and 2020, a quintupling by 2050, 
and a 10-fold increase by 2100. 
The heavy solid lines in Figures 
3 and 4 show the implications for 
sulfur and carbon emissions. By 
2030, Asia alone will emit more 
sulfur dioxide than the entire 
world did in 1990. By 2050, the 
same will be true for carbon diox-
ide. And by 2100, world carbon 
dioxide emissions will be 23 giga-
tons ( 1 gigaton equals 109 tons), 
more than four times the 1990 
level. Thus, a future with no new 
policies to limit sulfur and carbon 
emissions promises to result in 
very high emissions indeed. 
Figure 3. Emissions of sulfur dioxide, Figure 4. Emissions of carbon dioxide, 
1990-2100 
250 
200 
I 
"" ~ 150 I 
"O 
1J 
" c ~ I I g' 
:I; 
50 
1990 201 0 2030 
:: 
"" 
80 
~ J "O 
" c ~ 
"' 
" :I; 
1990 2010 2030 
-- Nonewcontrols 
- - Controls on sulft.r 
World 
'-., -
•, 
------..:::::. .. J 
2050 
Year 
Asia 
2050 
Year 
2070 2090 
'• 
'• 
' 
................ ______ 
2070 2090 
......... .. Controls on carton 
-- Accelerated tedro-
IOgical progress 
NOTE: 1 megaton = 106 tons. 
SOURCE: llASA Environmentally Compatible 
Energy Strategies Project. 
VOLUME 41 NUMBER 3 
1990-2100 
c 
0 
-e 
N 
" 
"O 
" c £ 
N 
"' i3 
c 
0 
-e 
N 
" 
"O 
" c ~ 
"' i3 
25 
20 
15 
10 
1990 2010 
12 
10 
1990 2010 
No newCOf'trols 
- - Controls on sulfur 
World 
2030 2050 
Year 
Asia 
2030 2050 
Year 
2070 2090 
2070 2090 
·----- Controls on carbon 
-- Accelerated techno-
log1cal progress 
NOTE: 1 gigaton = 109 tons. 
SOURCE: llASA Environmentally Compatible 
Energy Strategies Project. 
ENVIRONMENT 7 
Table 3. Changes in agricultural output in the baseline 
case,2050(percentchange) 
Crop Agricultural 
Region Production GDP 
North America 1.3 0.8 
Western Europe -0.2 1.5 
Eastern and Central Europe, 
plus former Soviet Union 9.2 8.3 
Pacific OECD 7.2 2.5 
Other Pacific Asia 2.8 2.5 
Sub-Saharan Africa 3.4 3.7 
Latin American and the Caribbean 0.5 0.1 
Middle East and North Africa 1.4 1.2 
Centrally planned Asia 1 -9.9 -8.2 
South Asia 2.2 2.0 
Developed countries 4.9 3.7 
Developing countries -0.8 -0.3 
World 0.5 0.7 
1lncludes China, Hong Kong, Laos, Viet Nam, Cambodia, North Korea , and 
Mongolia. 
NOTE: This table shows the percentage changes in crop production (meas-
ured in bushels) and agricultural GDP (measured in dollars) that would occur 
by 2050 as a result of changes in climate and acidification relative to a hypo-
thetical future based on the baseline assumptions, including no new efforts to 
curb sulfur and carbon emissions. 
SOURCE: llASA Modeling Land-Use and Land-Cover Changes in Europe 
and Northern Asia Project. 
Agricultural Impacts ruption of natural phenomena 
such as the North Atlantic current 
Emissions in and of them- that keeps northern Europe rela-
selves are not the principal con- tively warm. Assessment of all 
cern, however. What matters is these potential impacts is beyond 
what they lead to in terms of the scope of this article. Instead, 
warmer weather; more extreme it will focus on one set of im-
weather; rises in sea level; loss of pacts- those on agriculture-that 
coastal lands and displacement of demonstrate how sulfur and car-
people; the spread of diseases; bon emissions can interact and 
the disrupt ion of ecosystems and how different the results can be 
agriculture ; and the possible dis- for different regions of the world. 
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Agriculture is particularly rele-
vant to Asia because it is a large 
part of the region's developing 
economies . Such economies, of 
course, are much more vulner-
able to climate change than are 
the manufacturing and service 
industries that dominate more 
developed economies. 
Using models developed at IIASA 
and elsewhere, the IIASA re-
searchers estimated the impacts 
on agriculture in 2050 of the 
baseline values for sulfur and 
carbon emissions. The results 
are shown in Tables 3 and 4. It 
should be emphasized that these 
results assume that farmers are 
"smart." This means that the 
models take into account farm-
ers' reactions to the changes in 
crop prices that will inevitably 
result from climate-induced 
changes in agricultural yields . If 
yields for a particular crop de-
crease as a result of climate 
change, then the price at which 
that crop can be sold will in-
crease, other things being equal. 
Rational farmers will weigh 
both the changing price signals 
(how much money they will 
earn per bushel) and the chang-
ing yields (how many bushels of 
each crop each acre will pro-
duce), planting those crops in 
those amounts that will maxi-
mize their incomes. Moreover, 
such adjustments will be made 
little by little as the climate 
gradually changes . The results 
given in the two tables are thus 
an improvement over those of 
earlier "dumb farmer" models 
that calculated how yields would 
change if the climate changed 
APRIL 1999 
overnight, with no adaptation by 
farmers . 
For the world as a whole, the 
results shown in Tables 3 and 4 
are posit ive : Production (the 
number of bushels produced) 
and agricultural GDP (the 
amount of income earned) both 
increase while prices drop . To 
be sure, there are regional di f-
ferences, with developed coun-
tries benefiting more than 
developing countries . But over-
all, the initial picture is sur-
prisingly benign . One reason 
for this is the assumption of 
smart farmers in the models. By 
responding to the price signals 
transmitted through interna-
tional agricultural markets, they 
both minimize any potential 
adverse impacts on agricultural 
production and take advantage 
of any opportunities created by 
climate change. A second rea-
son is that a higher concentra-
tion of carbon dioxide would 
have positive as well as nega-
tive effects on agriculture. The 
negative effect, of course, 
would come from global 
warming, which would reduce 
the yields of crops adapted to 
today's climate (though not all 
areas would experience nega-
tive impacts, nor to the same 
degree) . The positive effect 
would be what is known as 
carbon dioxide fertilization. 
Because plants utilize carbon 
dioxide from the atmosphere in 
photosynthesis, the greater the 
concentration of carbon dioxide, 
the greater the yield. 
There is a third reason for the 
generally positive results shown 
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in Tables 3 and 4, which has to 
do with the increase in emissions 
of sulfur in the baseline projec-
tion. Sulfur emitted into the at-
mosphere contributes to the 
formation of sulfate aerosols. 
These particles reflect sunlight 
and remain in the atmosphere 
long enough to have a significant 
cooling effect that partially off-
sets the greenhouse effect from 
more carbon dioxide.6 In the 
results shown, sulfur emissions 
largely offset the warming effect 
of increased carbon dioxide-but 
not its fertilization effects. In this 
scenario, therefore, crops are 
substantially protected from the 
negative effects of high carbon 
dioxide concentrations while 
benefiting from the positive 
effects. 
If all one cared about were 
global agricultural GDP, Tables 3 
and 4 would certainly not provide 
support for new policies to re-
strict sulfur and carbon. Indeed, 
they suggest just the opposite. 
There are at least four problems 
with such an interpretation, how-
ever. First, the aggregate agri-
cultural benefit shown in these 
tables comes at the expense of 
the developing countries. Agri-
culture in the region including 
China and centrally planned Asia 
is particularly hard hit by acidifi-
cation from sulfur. Second, there 
is significant uncertainty sur-
rounding the carbon dioxide fer-
tilization effects. Tables 3 and 4 
are based on optimistic assump-
tions; less optimistic assumptions 
produce less favorable results. 
Third, global warming is a long-
term phenomenon, and by 2100 
Table 4. Changes in 
agricultural prices in the 
baseline case, 2050 
Percent 
Product Change 
Cereals -9.0 
Other crops -12.0 
All crops -11.0 
All agricultural 
products -9.0 
NOTE: This table shows the per-
centage changes in agricultural 
prices that would occur by 2050 as 
a result of climate change and 
acidification relative to a hypotheti-
cal future based on the baseline 
assumptions. 
SOURCE: See Table 3. 
the slightly pos1t1ve balance in 
Table 3 will become a slightly 
negative balance. And fourth, the 
tables address only macroeco-
nomic agricultural impacts, not 
the full range of effects noted at 
the beginning of this section. 
Despite their importance, par-
ticularly to developing countries, 
these impacts constitute only one 
of the many pieces of information 
needed to fully evaluate alternative 
policies. 
To become familiar with both 
the analytical framework and the 
complexities of the issues in-
volved, let us look at the first 
issue-acidification-and consider 
a strategy that focuses on that 
problem exclusively, i.e., one that 
aims to reduce sulfur emissions 
before attempting to deal with 
carbon emissions. 
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Figure 5. Excess depositions of sulfur in Asia, 1990 and 
2050 
1990 
2050 
I • ~ 
. /~ 
·~-. ·e,wL ' - .... 
• C> .... 
~c:::-1 ... , 
Milligrams per square meter per year 
0 CJ 1,000 CJ 10,000 -
100 CJ 2,000 CJ 20,000 -
500 CJ 5,000 99,999 -
NOTES: Excess depositions are those that exceed critical loads (the 
maximum loads that can occur without damage to the environment). The 
pattern projected for 2050 is based on the assumption that there are no 
new efforts to curb sulfur and carbon emissions. 
SOURCE: llASA Transboundary Air Pollution Project. 
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Sulfur Limits First 
Figure 5 shows the impact that 
the baseline emissions of sulfur 
dioxide would likely have on 
ecosystems in Asia. It compares 
the projected depositions of sul-
fur with the so-called critical 
loads, i.e., the maximum long-
term deposition levels that can be 
tolerated with minimal environ-
mental damage . The top part of 
the figure shows the situation in 
1990. At that time, there were 
excess depositions higher than 
1 gram per square meter per year 
in southern and eastern China, 
Korea, and southern Japan, with 
isolated "hot spots" around large 
em1ss10n sources in Thailand. 
However, in most of Asia depo-
sitions were at relatively low 
levels, so that acidification was 
not a widespread problem. 
The situation is projected to be 
much worse by 2050, however, 
as shown in the bottom part of 
the figure. In that year, large 
parts of China, Thailand, and 
both Koreas would experience 
depositions higher than critical 
loads, with isolated hot spots in 
Indonesia and Japan . Vast areas 
would suffer excess deposition 
higher than 5 grams per square 
meter per year, and in China ex-
cess deposition above 20 grams 
per square meter per year would 
affect some 200,000 square 
kilometers of territory . Such lev-
els are much higher than those 
observed in the heavily polluted 
"Black Triangle" of Central 
Europe in the 1980s. Signifi-
cantly lower pollution levels are 
known to have caused ecological 
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disasters in Europe, such as 
large-scale forest dieback. The 
projection for 2050 thus poses a 
real threat to economically im-
portant ecosystems, particularly 
rice fields in southern China. 
Without a doubt, the acidifica-
tion projected in Figure 5 would 
cause ecological disaster in much 
of Asia . The damage to unman-
aged ecosystems would likely be 
much greater than the harm done 
to agriculture, which would be 
substantial. In a nutshell, envi-
ronmentally sustainable, coal-
intensive development in Asia 
without emission controls on 
sulfur is simply not possible. 
Most countries in Asia are 
aware of this constraint on their 
growth. As mentioned earlier, 
China in particular has already 
adopted some policies to limit 
sulfur emissions, and such efforts 
are likely to be expanded and 
strengthened in the future . At the 
same time, however, China, In-
dia, and most other developing 
countries in Asia continue to 
resist any limits on their carbon 
emissions. If this pattern of "sul-
fur limits first" were to continue, 
what implications would it have 
for Asia and the world? And are 
there any positive spinoffs in 
terms of global warming, that is, 
would attempting to limit sulfur 
emissions entail limiting carbon 
emissions as well? 
To address these questions, the 
l!ASA researchers repeated the 
analyses described above assuming 
limits on sulfur emissions consistent 
with a reasonably high level of 
ecosystem protection. The results 
are shown by the dashed lines in 
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Figures 3 and 4. By 2050, Asia's 
emissions of sulfur would be only 
14 percent of those that would oc-
cur if no new reduction policies 
were introduced. Unfortunately, 
these reductions would have little 
effect on carbon emissions. As 
indicated by the dashed lines in 
Figure 4, world carbon emissions in 
2100 would be only 6 percent lower 
than in the baseline case, and Asian 
emissions would be only 3 percent 
lower. Worse, the loss of cooling 
sulfate aerosols in the sulfur-limits-
· first strategy implies that tempera-
tures would be significantly higher. 
Whereas the global mean tempera-
ture would increase 1.2° C by 2050 
(relative to 1990) in the baseline 
case, it would increase 1. 7° C in the 
case of sulfur limits first. The gap 
would be even wider in 2100, 
3.5° C as opposed to 2.6° C. 
Table 5 shows that although 
global agricultural production 
would increase slightly in the 
case of sulfur limits first, agri-
cultural GDP would be the same 
Table 5. Changes in agricultural output with sulfur 
controls only, 2050 (percent change) 
Crop Agricultural 
Region Production GDP 
North America 4.1 3.4 
Western Europe -2.7 0.6 
Eastern and Central Europe, 
plus former Soviet Union 8.9 8.2 
Pacific OECD 5.9 1.9 
Other Pacific Asia -2.0 -1.5 
Sub-Saharan Africa -0.4 0.4 
Latin America and the Caribbean -3.7 -3.2 
Middle East and North Africa -2.0 -1.5 
Centrally planned Asia 1 3.1 2.2 
South Asia -2 .0 -1.3 
Developed countries 5.3 4.5 
Developing countries -0.8 -0.5 
World 0.7 0.7 
11ncludes China, Hong Kong, Laos, Viet Nam, Cambodia, North Korea, and 
Mongolia. 
NOTE: This table shows the percentage changes in crop production (meas-
ured in bushels) and agricultural GOP (measured in dollars) that would occur 
by 2050 as a result of changes in climate and acidification relative to a hypo-
thetical future based on the baseline assumptions but with new efforts to curb 
sulfur emissions. 
SOURCE: llASA Modeling Land-Use and Land-Cover in Europe and Northern 
Asia Project. 
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as m the baseline case . What 
does change- and rather signifi-
cantly- is the regional pattern of 
gains and losses. The centrally 
planned countries in Asia gain 
tremendously, but largely at the 
expense of other developing re-
gions. North American countries 
also gain at those countries' ex-
pense. However, North America's 
gain is due less to changes in climate 
at home than it is to less favorable 
production conditions--and conse-
quent increases in imports- in 
the more vulnerable developing 
countries. 
Carbon Limits First 
What would happen if policy-
makers were to pursue a strategy 
of limiting carbon emissions 
first? Would such a policy have 
positive spinoffs in terms of re-
ducing acid rain? The short an-
swer is yes, but only in the long 
term. The dotted lines in Figures 
3 and 4 show both carbon and 
sulfur emissions when the carbon 
concentration in the atmosphere 
is stabilized at 550 parts per mil-
lion . Through about 2030, sulfur 
emissions follow pretty much the 
same path as in the baseline case, 
after which they decline sharply . 
This is a bit of a surprise- one 
might well have expected limits 
on carbon to lead to early reduc-
tions in the use of coal with its 
high emissions of sulfur. The 
reason for the delay is that the 
stabilization of the carbon con-
centration can be accomplished 
equally well by early or late re-
ductions in carbon emissions. 
That is, timing is not terribly 
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important in meeting the envi-
ronmental objective. It does af-
fect costs, however-the more 
society can delay these reduc-
tions (by, for instance, waiting 
until existing facilities are due for 
replacement or low-carbon tech-
nologies become more efficient), 
the less those reductions will 
cost. 
The impact of a carbon-limits-
first strategy on global warming 
is clear. As indicated by the dot-
ted lines in Figure 4, global car-
bon emissions in 2050 would be 
23 percent lower than in the 
baseline case. By 2100, carbon 
emissions would be only 2.8 
gigatons, less than half their level 
in I 990. Because of the huge 
inertia in the global climate sys-
tem, however, the effect on 
global temperatures would lag 
behind the reduction in emis-
sions . The mean global tempera-
ture in 2050 would still be 1.2° C 
higher than in 1990; in 2100, it 
would be 2.4° C higher. But the 
most important outcome in terms 
of global warming is the stabili -
zation of atmospheric carbon 
dioxide at 550 parts per million . 
Table 6 shows the impact of 
such carbon reductions and the 
lagged sulfur reductions on agri-
culture. Both the world as a 
whole and developing countries 
as a group are better off than in 
either the baseline or sulfur-
limits-first cases. But again, the 
result is due entirely to the good 
fortune of North America and the 
centrally planned economies in 
Asia. Every other region does 
worse than if there were no new 
policies at all. 
Accelerated Technology: 
An Alternative 
If a sulfur-limits-first strategy 
does not prevent global warming 
for free, and a carbon-limits-first 
strategy does not solve the acidi-
fication problem for free, what 
about starting with sulfur reduc-
tions (the more immediate con-
cern) and later shifting to carbon 
reductions (the longer term con-
cern)? The danger here is one of 
technological lock-in . As an ex-
ample, consider the QWERTY 
keyboard- the standard key-
board layout in which the first six 
letters on the top row are Q, W, 
E, R, T, and Y. This is certainly 
not the only possible arrange-
ment of the keys, and inventors 
have come up with alternatives 
that may be ergonomically supe-
rior. Yet the QWERTY keyboard 
is as pervasive as ever. At least 
two arguments are given for its 
success. First, when the 
QWERTY keyboard was intro-
duced, the mechanical hammers 
that actually struck the typewriter 
ribbon and paper were less likely 
to jam together than was the case 
with other layouts. Second, as its 
popularity grew, the QWERTY 
keyboard became transformed 
into a standard . Typing courses 
used these typewriters, busi-
nesses purchased them and ex-
pected employees to be proficient 
on them, suppliers featured them, 
and manufacturers produced 
them. Now, particularly in com-
puter applications, hammer-lock 
is hardly an issue. But we are 
firmly locked in to the QWERTY 
layout. 
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In addition to technological 
advantages and the preference for 
a standard technology, there are 
at least two other reasons for 
technological lock-in. The most 
important is technological learn-
ing-as we gain experience with 
any given technology, the cost of 
production generally goes down 
and performance, quality, and 
efficiency of the product go up. 
This makes it increasingly diffi-
cult for alternatives that appear 
later to catch up. The second 
reason is government regulation. 
1 f, for instance, the government 
requires a catalytic converter on 
every new car, this removes the 
incentive to come up with al-
ternative solutions as well as 
dramatically increasing the 
speed with which the cost of 
such converters falls and their 
performance improves. Even if 
the government were later to 
replace the requirement to use 
catalytic converters with flexible 
emissions limits, the converter 
technology would still be the de 
facto standard-and would have 
intimidating cost and perform-
ance advantages over potential 
competitors with less experience. 
This is the risk of a strategy 
that attempts to limit sulfur emis-
sions first and only later turns to 
limiting carbon emissions. To see 
this, note that there are five prin-
cipal ways to curb emissions of 
sulfur: scrubbing (which ac-
counts for more than 70 percent 
of the reductions achieved by the 
sulfur-limits-first strategy in the 
short term); cleaning the coal 
prior to combustion to remove 
sulfur; switching from "dirty" to 
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Table 6. Changes in agricultural output with carbon 
controls only, 2050 (percent change) 
Crop Agricultural 
Region Production GDP 
North America 2.2 1.7 
Western Europe -2 .0 0.8 
Eastern and Central Europe, 
plus former Soviet Union 8.8 8.1 
Pacific OECD 5.2 1.9 
Other Pacific Asia 1.3 1.4 
Sub-Saharan Africa 1.0 1.8 
Latin America and the Caribbean -1.2 -1.1 
Middle East and North Africa 0 .1 0.2 
Centrally planned Asia 1 -2.8 -2.3 
South Asia 0.8 1.0 
Developed countries 4.5 3.7 
Developing countries -0.4 0 .0 
World 0.8 0.9 
11ncludes China, Hong Kong, Laos, Viet Nam, Cambodia, North Korea, and 
Mongolia. 
NOTE: This table shows the percentage changes in crop production (meas-
ured in bushels) and agricultural GDP (measured in dollars) that would occur 
by 2050 as a result of changes in climate and acidification relative to a hypo-
thetical future based on the baseline assumptions but with new efforts to curb 
carbon emissions. 
SOURCE: llASA Modeling Land-Use and Land-Cover in Europe and Northern 
Asia Project. 
"clean" coal technologies, such 
as integrated gasification com-
bined cycle technologies, fluid-
ized bed technologies, and coal-
sourced fuel cells 7 (these are 
expected to account for 40 per-
cent of sulfur reductions 
achieved by the sulfur-limits-first 
strategy by 2050); converting the 
coal to synthetic fuels prior to 
combustion; and switching from 
coal to less sulfurous fuels. 
The final item on this list is the 
exception that proves the rule. 
The other strategies strive to 
make burning coal cleaner (at 
least in terms of sulfur emis-
sions), not to advance noncoal 
technologies. But of all fossil 
fuels, indeed of all fuels, coal 
emits the most carbon per unit of 
useful energy. Making coal 
cleaner in terms of sulfur emis-
sions makes very little difference 
in terms of carbon emissions, but 
it will have the important effect 
of locking in coal technologies. 
This will further entrench coal's 
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position in the world's energy 
mix, making it increasingly diffi-
cult to switch to a low-coal strat-
egy later. This point becomes 
very clear when one considers 
the dramatically different amounts 
of coal that would be burned un-
der the sulfur-limits-first strategy 
and the carbon-limits-first strat-
egy. Under the former, coal 
would make up 41 percent of the 
primary energy used in 2100, 
only one percentage point lower 
than in the baseline case. In con-
trast, coal would comprise only 
I 5 percent of primary energy use 
under the carbon-limits-first 
strategy . 
How then might we design a 
strategy that accomplishes the 
short-term objective of reducing 
sulfur emissions without locking 
ourselves into technologies that 
will only make it harder to re-
duce carbon emissions? The so-
lution appears to lie in "going 
outside the box," i.e., focusing on 
the broader patterns of techno-
logical change rather than on 
specific emission limits and the 
relatively narrow set of technolo-
gies that such limits affect di -
rectly . To that end, let us 
consider what might happen un-
der a policy that is designed to 
accelerate technological progress 
across the board . 
The sulfur and carbon emission 
levels that result from one plausible 
set of assumptions about general 
technological progress are shown 
by the thin solid lines in Figures 3 
and 4, and they are impressive. 
Under these assumptions, sulfur 
emissions would effectively match 
the low levels of the sulfur-limits-
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first strategy and carbon emissions 
would match the low levels of the 
carbon-limits-first strategy, despite 
the absence of explicit targets for 
sulfur and carbon emissions. The 
assumptions underlying these re-
sults are ambitious but not unreal-
istic. In formulating them, the 
IIASA researchers considered three 
distinct categories of technologies: 
static, incremental, and radical. The 
static category included mature 
technologies where most of the 
potential improvements have al-
ready been achieved through years 
of experience; for these no further 
cost and performance improve-
ments were assumed. At the other 
end of the spectrum were the radi-
cal new technologies with lots of 
untapped potential; for these, it was 
assumed that the costs would de-
crease 30 percent each time the 
extent of their use doubled. In the 
middle were the incremental tech-
nologies where additional experi-
ence should lead to less rapid-but 
still significant-{;ost reductions of 
15 percent for each doubling in 
use. Lest these figures seem overly 
optimistic, one should note that 
between 1930 and 1950, the cost of 
electricity in the United States de-
clined 29 percent each time the 
market doubled. 
All the analyses described here 
reflect the widespread (and 
growing) global preference for 
cleaner, more flexible, and more 
convenient end-use fuels such as 
electricity. Given this, (the as-
sumed) acceleration of techno-
logical progress would lead to 
rapid adoption of cleaner tech-
nologies, which would lead to 
rapidly declining costs and thus to 
even more rapid adoption of these 
technologies, and so on in a virtu-
ous circle. The final result would 
be the very low sulfur and carbon 
emissions shown by the thin solid 
lines in Figures 3 and 4. 
The most important question 
that this analysis leaves open is 
how to design policies to acceler-
ate technological progress across 
the board . Part of the solution is 
increased public and private in-
vestments in energy research, 
development, and demonstration 
(RD&D). Such crucial invest-
ments generally declined during 
the 1980s and 1990s. In 1997, for 
example, the U.S. Department of 
Energy spent only $1.28 billion 
on applied energy technology, 
down from $2.18 billion in 1992 
and $6.15 billion in 1978 (all 
figures are in 1997 dollars) . Pri-
vate sector investment in elec-
tricity RD&D declined by nearly 
one-third from I 992 to 1997. At 
the very least, accelerating tech-
nological progress will require 
much more investment, but it 
will also require that this be done 
creatively and efficiently. That 
will require judgment and analy-
sis that is beyond the scope of 
this article. 
Conclusion 
This article is about two types 
of interactions that are relevant to 
efforts to limit both acid rain and 
global warming. The first are the 
interactions between sulfur and 
carbon emissions in producing the 
impacts that ultimately matter, 
such as the impacts on agriculture 
in Asia. The second are behavioral 
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interactions, i.e., the rational 
responses to policies targeting 
one problem that make the other 
more difficult to solve. Here the 
article focused on incentives to 
limit sulfur emissions in Asia in 
the near term, which might well 
create incentives making it harder 
to limit carbon emissions. 
The initial calculation of what 
would happen with no new poli-
cies to limit sulfur and carbon 
emissions suggested that the in-
teractions between sulfur and 
carbon emissions might work to 
the world's advantage. That is, 
the cooling effect of sulfate aero-
sols would offset global warming 
from carbon dioxide, while car-
bon dioxide fertilization would 
more than offset crop losses due 
to acidification. The net result for 
the world as a whole in 2050 
would be slight increases in agri-
cultural production and GDP and 
a slight decrease in prices-
hardly a reason to limit sulfur 
and carbon emissions. 
While this result is illuminating 
in terms of the possible interac-
tions between different chemical 
substances, there are two things 
wrong with it as a basis for 
policy . First, it is a tenuous 
result: Reasonable changes in the 
assumptions about carbon diox-
ide fertilization plus the inclusion 
of agricultural impacts after 2050 
tip the balance in the other direc-
tion, although hardly by enough 
to compel urgent action now. 
Second, it ignores the realities 
of regional differences and poli-
tics. It is highly unlikely that the 
centrally planned countries of Asia 
would tolerate the damage they 
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would suffer under this scenario, 
even if the rest of the world 
benefited by more than just 
the few percentage points shown 
in Table 3. Indeed, China has 
already started to take action to 
reduce sulfur emissions. And 
while that is good for China, it 
removes much of the potential 
sulfate aerosol shade that would 
otherwise tend to limit global 
warming. Even worse, a strategy 
of sulfur limits first does almost 
nothing to reduce carbon emis-
sions and even entrenches the 
importance of coal. An alterna-
tive policy of carbon limits first 
creates incentives with the 
spinoff benefit of reducing sulfur 
emissions, but only in the long 
run. The incentives are to delay if 
the focus is carbon, and delay 
does nothing to reduce the acidi-
fication and agricultural damage 
that matter in the near term. 
But it is possible to imagine de-
velopments that would accom-
plish both the near-term objective 
of reducing sulfur emissions and 
the longer term objective of re-
ducing carbon emissions. The 
example outlined above focused 
not on one side or the other of the 
carbon-sulfur equation but on the 
technologies that are common to 
both. Ultimately, in a world where 
population and living standards 
are expected to grow for a long 
time yet, technology may be the 
best route to reducing environ-
mental damage from energy use. 
That means that the faster we can 
improve technology the better. 
And the broad message appears to 
be that we should figuratively "let 
a thousand flowers bloom" so that 
many millions can bloom literally. 
Too narrow a focus risks creating 
perverse incentives destined to 
haunt us for a long time. 
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I . On the Kyoto conference, see the 
November I 997 issue of Environment 
as well as H. E. Ott, "The Kyoto Proto-
col: Unfinished Business," Environ-
ment, July/August 1998, 16. On the 
Buenos Aires conference, see J. Lanch-
bery, "Expectations for the Climate 
Talks in Buenos Aires," Environment, 
October 1998, 16. 
2. World Resources Institute, United 
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Nations Development Programme, and 
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3. Executive body for the Convention on 
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4. N. Kato, "Analysis of Structure of 
Energy Consumption and Dynamics of 
Emission of Atmospheric Species Re-
lated to the Global Environmental 
Change (SOx, NOx, and C02) in Asia," 
Atmospheric Environment 30, no. 5 
(1996): 757; and N. Nakicenovic, A. 
GrUbler, and A. McDonald, eds ., Global 
Energy Perspectives (Cambridge, U.K.: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998). 
5. For more on China' s efforts to curb 
pollution, see R. A. Bohm, C. Ge, M. 
Russell, J. Wang, and J. Yang, "Envi-
ronmental Taxes: China's Bold Initia-
tive," Environment, September 1998, 10. 
6. The importance of sulfate aerosols 
gained increased visibility through the 
Second Assessment Report of the Inter-
governmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC). Previously, models of atmos-
pheric change were predicting more 
warming than had actually occurred, 
and this seriously undermined their 
credibility . With the cooling effect of 
sulfate aerosols (among other factors) 
taken into account, the models' esti-
mates of past temperature increases 
were more accurate . The match was 
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sufficiently good that IPCC concluded 
for the first time that "the balance of 
evidence suggests a discernable human 
influence on the climate system." See J. 
T. Houghton et al., eds., Climate 
Change 1995: The Science of Climate 
Change, Contribution of Working 
Group I to the Second Assessment 
Report of the Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate Change (Cambridge, U.K. : 
Cambridge University Press, 1996). For 
a review of that report , see W. C. Clark 
and J. Jager, "Climate Change 1995: 
The Science of Climate Change," Envi-
ronment, November 1997, 23. 
7. Combined cycle power plants burn 
gas fuels such as natural gas. The re-
sulting combustion gases, which are 
under high pressure, spin a turbine that 
generates electricity. This is the "top" 
cycle of the combined cycle process . 
After passing through the turbine, the 
hot gases are used to boil water in a 
steam generator. High-pressure steam 
then spins another electricity-generating 
turbine in the "bottom" cycle of the 
process. In an integrated gasification 
combined cycle (IGCC) power plant, 
the fuel is produced by gasifying coal, 
which removes almost all of the sulfur 
from the resulting gas. As a result, 
sulfur emissions from such a plant are 
very low. 
In fluidized bed technologies, pul-
verized coal is mixed with pulverized 
limestone or dolomite and ash pebbles 
and suspended by jets of air during 
combustion. (The suspended mixture, or 
"bed," behaves much like a liquid, 
hence its name.) The pulverized coal 
bums much more efficiently than in a 
standard coal-fired power plant. Be-
cause it burns at a lower temperature , 
fewer nitrogen oxides are produced. In 
addition, the limestone or dolomite 
absorbs nearly all of the sulfur dioxide 
produced during combustion. 
Fuel cells, like batteries, convert 
chemical energy to electricity directly, 
without combustion. As a result, they 
produce no sulfur emissions. Although 
fuel cells powered directly by coal are 
probably more than a few decades 
away, those utilizing gasified coal are 
available now. 
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